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Abstract 
This paper aims to exemplify the language acquisition model by tracing back to the Socratic 
model of language learning procedure that sets down inborn knowledge, a kind of implicit 
knowledge that becomes explicit in our language. Jotting down the claims in Meno, Plato 
triggers a representationalist outline basing on the deductive reasoning, where the conclusion 
follows from the premises (inborn knowledge) rather than experience. This revolution comes 
from the pen of Noam Chomsky, who amends the empiricist position on the creativity of 
language by pinning down it with the innateness hypothesis. However, Chomsky never 
rejects the external world or the linguistic stipulation that relies on the objective reality. 
 Wittgenstein‘s model of language acquisition upholds a liaison centric appeal that 
stands between experience (use theory of meaning) and mentalism (mind based inner 
experiences). Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus never demarcates the definite mental processes that 
entangles with the method of understanding and meaning. Wittgenstein‘s ‗language game‘ 
takes care of the model of language acquisition in a paradigmatic way. The way portrait 
language as the form of life and the process of language acquisition is nothing but a language 
game that relies on the activity of men.  
Key words: Language learning, Wittgenstein, Plato, Chomsky, Innate, Inborn knowledge, 
Rule following, Language-game. 
 
The problem that initiates a tremendous debate in philosophy mainly concerned about the 
questions of linguistic acquisition and language learning procedure. Tracking back to Plato 
and holding the position of the Chomskean belt (innate based generative grammar), I think 
Wittgenstein, who may perhaps be inspired by Hume‘s legacy (empiricist way) has 
significantly fulfilled an impressive intermediary stance by bringing the model of language 
acquisition induces through the language-game and rule following procedures. 
2 
 
Socratic Model of Language Learning 
Let me clarify the Socratic model of language learning, a key model of language learning 
method in western philosophy that is instigated by the great Greek philosopher Socrates. A 
newborn baby, an amazing creature of the world who has born without language, but learns it 
somehow through his/her mind that relates to the world. The puzzle regains when we consider 
what a newborn baby learned is very creative (in the sense of productivity) or is a part of 
representation (in the sense of creativity) of mind. Socratic model of learning as appears in 
Plato‘s Meno, refrains the moving beyond possibilities by defending the acquired knowledge 
that underrates a new productive knowledge. Plato‘s Meno highlights on the following query: 
‗can virtue be taught?‘ Here Socratic model intends to classify inborn knowledge or the 
knowledge that one already have in his/her mind initiating through representations, otherwise 
no knowledge can be obtained unless it is already having in the agent‘s mind. The procedure 
of learning is nothing but a kind of recollection. The conception of new knowledge is an 
expression that is already latently sited in the mind of the language users. Socratic model of 
teaching a slave boy on geometry specifies that the boy actually knows geometry, even 
though he has hitherto been unaware of the processing of the particular knowledge. In Meno, 
Socrates concerns about the latent implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge. He claims that 
the procedure of learning the implicit knowledge becomes explicit in our language. The 
explicit knowledge is not actually an acquired knowledge (new); the content of the knowledge 
has been already in the agent‘s mind as in Platonic model the knowledge remains eternal and 
static. The dilemma arises because what the agent knows is a type of recollection that s/he has 
forgotten; so in this sense the acquired knowledge remains new, but still the acquired 
knowledge is non-new, as it has latently located in the agent‘s mind. In Meno, Socrates says: 
Nothing prevents a man after recalling one thing only–a process which man 
calls learning –discovering everything else for himself. (Plato: 1981, 81d) 
A query may arise, ‗what role does experience play here?‘ Actually, in Socratic model, 
experience plays the role of triggering knowledge and the knowledge can deduce later in the 
case of representation or recollection, so doubtlessly the process of learning in this model is 
relied on the deductive (deduction) centric reasoning where the conclusion follows from the 
premises. The constructive challenges to the mentioned arguments come from the account of 
empiricist David Hume. It defines the necessary parts of the challenge by claiming that there 
may be some knowledge that does not depend on the Platonic metaphor of the rigid pre-
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existent formation of knowledge. Hume‘s stance emphasizes on the experienced based 
learning procedures that intend towards the creativity of the mind. In Hume‘s words: 
...all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of 
compounding, transposing augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded 
us by the senses and experience. (Hume: 2011, 586) 
One point that needs to be clarified here is the conception of creativity. In Plato‘s account, 
creativity seems to be a kind of representation, whereas Hume confers creativity as a kind of 
productivity of the agent‘s mind. For Hume, the mind does not produce latent knowledge, but 
actively produces new knowledge through experience as building block entangling with the 
mind. 
Chomskean Model of Language Acquisition 
Noam Chomsky, the celebrated linguist has it in mind that the empiricist explanation of 
knowledge and their way out of the creativity of language to defend the productivity of 
language looks provocative. Chomsky intensely instigates an exclusive aptitude of human 
language that he called ‗innate universal grammar‘ that envisages the generative and 
transformative rules together. Chomsky seems inspired by the Cartesian legacy as Descartes 
keeps apart mind from the physical world and frames it in a more prolific way to make out 
mind in the scope of human knowledge. However, he thinks that we are not proficient to 
promote the innate universal grammar through empiricism (an adventitious construct) and the 
concept of innate grammar in its universal form is certainly an intricate component of the 
mind. Chomsky says: 
As for Hume, I think he was wrong in his empirical assumption about the 
principles by which the mind is actuated, innate, and acquired, but right in the 
way he formulated the question, particularly, in taking his inquiry to be 
analogous to physics. (Chomsky: 1980, 31) 
The wide-ranging linguistic theory is closer to the taxonomic linguistic model that aims to 
resolve grammar from the juncture of corpus of data, whereas the rationalist version infringes 
the intrinsic properties of language acquisition, as the transformational grammar must have a 
mental structure depending on the innateness hypothesis. A prolegomenon that hinges on 
knowledge and language seems initially necessary in Chomsky‘s language acquisition 
method. Knowing the language is a task of internalizing grammar that metes out upon the 
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structural description engaged highly with the rules and grammar. Certainly, this rationalist 
approach is to see knowledge or language speculates knowledge in terms of the disposition of 
mind. Chomsky answers to the Socratic model or we can say, Plato‘s problem (Plato‘s 
problem is generally called the ―poverty of the stimulus‖ that argues in favor of limit of 
generalization in the sense of linguistic experience) is as follows: 
...there is a biological entity, a finite mental organ, which develops in children 
along one of a number of paths. The paths are determined in advance of any 
childhood experience. The language organ that emerges, the grammar, is 
represented in the brain and plays a central role in the person‘s use of language. 
(Lightfoot: 2005, 45-46)   
One can defend that grammar in Chomsky‘s sense has a great import in the theory of 
language that congregates the model of ―descriptive adequacy‖, a model that corresponds to 
the intrinsic competence of the idealized agent (the linguistic intuition) who has the capability 
to preferring correct grammar from alternatives. The conception ―explanatory adequacy‖ 
helps to attain it.  
 As we know that, the meaning is a primordial part of language. Meaning in 
Chomskean and especially in Katz‘s model is considered as a set of rules that oversee the 
underlying grammatical structures. However, the rules can acquire the knowledge of language 
basing on an internalized structure that Chomsky called ‗I-language‘, a mode of competency 
that is innate based. Moreover, children born with the principle of universal grammar that 
espouses a kind of creativity and understanding to them when they are confronted with 
unfamiliar sentences. Chomsky believes that to know a language is to know a set of rules that 
will resolve an infinite number of sentences and doubtlessly this attitude goes beyond the 
mechanism of ‗stimulus‘ control. In the case of learning language, Chomsky admits that the 
learning language does not merely rely on the process of piling up the ‗behavioural 
repertoire‘, but he says, ‗we somehow develop certain principles (unconscious, of course) that 
decide the form and meaning of indefinitely many sentences.‘ (Chomsky, 1969, 64) One can 
argue that the developing principles are not in a sense innate rather it sounds extensional as 
we could acquire them through the steady of behavioural interaction with the world or socio-
linguistic interaction of the world and others. To review Skinner‘s work Verbal Behavior, 
Chomsky argues that the utterances of an individual cannot be under controlled by the stimuli 
or the manipulation of those stimuli and writes, ‗We cannot predict verbal behavior in terms 
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of the stimuli in the speaker‘s environment, since we do not know what the current stimuli are 
he responds.‘ (Chomsky, 1964, 553) the creativity of language uses regain when the speaker 
is beyond of any stimuli control and create the sentences innovatively. This sort of antipathy 
outlook against behaviorism or in a nutshell the habit-structure of language acquisition leads 
towards a capacity that produces an indefinite numbers of new sentences with the limited 
accessibility of words. I will not elaborate the Chomskean paradigm of language learning 
here, as it is not my key concerned of the paper. 
Wittgenstein’s Model of Language Acquisition 
The Moorean philosophical way to secure the ‗common sense‘ exhibits a kind of certainty or 
self-evidence of the common sensual belief that is fundamentally interlinked to the conceptual 
system. Moore writes: 
Starting, therefore, from the view of Common Sense that there certainly are in 
the Universe (1) material objects in space and  (2)  the acts of consciousness of 
men and animals upon the earth, we might most simply get a general 
description of the Universe in one or other of two ways: Either by saying , 
these two kinds of things are the only kinds in the Universe or by saying: they 
are the only kinds we know to be in it, but there may possibly also be others. 
(Moore: 1966, 28) 
Wittgenstein reiterates Moore‘s model, but aims to reject the approach in favour of Common 
Sense about worldview. He appreciates Moore‘s quest for safeguarding the existence of the 
external world to get rid of the wicked plea of scepticism. Sceptic‘s claims against the 
existence of common sense based objects are not only any false conviction, but it looks 
meaningless to Wittgenstein. The bedrock of our beliefs following Moore‘s dictum of 
Common Sense depends on the frame of the reference, a fundamental structure (in 
Wittgenstein‘s word ‗foundational-wall‘) of our thought or belief related to the external 
world. Wittgenstein says, ‗the truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our frame of 
reference.‘ (Wittgenstein, 1974, 83) He also admits that the conceptual changes often insist a 
considerable role in our language, but we find a natural limit between what sort of concept the 
agents actually holds and what the world in reality is. The conception of certainty is a 
puzzling situation. How could a person be certain about his/her knowledge? The conception 
of certainty copes with the subject and object interaction, but in a different level. On 
Certainty, particularly in the section 115 commences the Cartesian quest for certainty by 
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defending that the conception of certainty precedes any continuous doubt as Wittgenstein  
puts it, ‗The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty‘. One should be certain about the 
fact that constructs the certainty of the meaning of the words of a proposition. Wittgenstein 
clarifies: 
Certainty is as it were a tone of voice in which one declares how things are, but 
one does not infer from the tone of voice that one is justified. (1974, 30)  
However, later Wittgenstein argues that in the process of knowing the conception of ‗I know‘ 
plays a logical insight that cannot be essential in any grammatical proposition like ‗I know 
that rose is red‘. In case of knowing a proposition, the subject-object interaction remains as an 
existing correspondence maintained between the meaning and rules. If we evaluate the 
meaning of the word with function, then Wittgenstein believes that mere changes of meaning 
will lead to a consequent change in its function. Wittgenstein writes: 
When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts and with the 
concepts the meaning of words change. (1974, 65) 
Now the decisive question is ‗how could we check the statement in language game?‘ 
Wittgensteinian model emphasizes on the understanding decorum as a trace back to true 
sentences. One can understand a false sentence (if presumed), and the whole task would be 
uncertain since in the process of description of a language game ‗truth‘ of a certain empirical 
proposition directs to the reference. So here, the bewilderment of philosophical analysis 
submerges into the domain of meaning and reference. Meaning for Wittgenstein is beyond of 
any image centric mind-set. The paradigmatic mode to express the apprehension of meaning 
relies on the explaining meaning of a particular word from an ostensive or verbal level. It 
seems to me that in the Blue Book, Wittgenstein does not strictly shun the mentalese 
approaches. The mental process can deal with the process of understanding and meaning 
through which language may use. Wittgenstein writes: 
The signs of our language seem dead without these mental processes; and it 
might seem that the only function of the signs is to induce such processes, and 
that these are the things we ought really to be interested in. Thus, if you are 
asked what is the relation between a name and the thing it names, you will be 
inclined to answer that the relation is a psychological one... (2009, 88) 
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Wittgenstein is partially (personally, I don‘t consider completely) aloof to the sense of mind 
given interaction with the reality or objectivity rather he hinges towards the meaning given 
activity that stresses on the claim that the sign of language depends on its uses. The picture 
theory of Tractatus blends the elements of the picture with things outside of the picture. We 
know that the first part of this encounter belongs between the picture and its elements while 
the second part of this correlation maintains the liaison of elements and the objectivity from 
the level of the users, not anyway from the stage of the picture itself. However, Tractatus 
represents that language is limited by its extent and the limits are conferred by its logical form 
and propositions that match up with the totality of the world. It sounds exciting that language 
is unable to represent the logical form or the totality of the world because of its transgressed 
limits. Language is not synonymous with certainty. In the preface to Tractatus (Tractatus, 3-
4), Wittgenstein draws the limit of thought on language. In addition, the solution that he urges 
would seem to be mere a posterior hypothesis as Wittgenstein claims, ‗What can be shown, 
cannot be said‘. (Tractatus, 4.1212). It means we can show the rules of the logical syntaxes in 
its uses of signs, or the formal concepts like objects and facts can be shown in different 
variables. However, Wittgenstein believes that the limit of proposition is reflected in the case 
of presenting the logical form of language. He calls this approach ‗mystical‘ as it manifests 
itself beyond any word expression and this approach helps us to think the world as a limited 
whole. (Tractatus, 6.45). Now the question is what sort of method philosophy need to adopt? 
Wittgenstein‘s response is as follows: 
The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing 
except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something 
that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else 
wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed 
to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be 
satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were 
teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one. 
(Tractatus, 6.53) 
However, the Tractatusian model of language learning has some limitations that are 
integrated by the phenomenon of the limits of thought. The new conception of language that 
vindicates meaning and use theory together emphasises a new sense in Wittgenstein‘s later 
work Philosophical Investigations or in short PI (1953) that he himself calls ‗a particular 
picture of the essence of human language‘. I think here philosophy embarks on the thesis of 
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what humans do and the way language functions. Philosophical Investigations and the 
explanation of philosophical queries grapple the sense of human activities. The concept of 
‗ostensive‘ uses of language to attain meaning leads not only to the meaning of the concrete 
objects, but also to the abstract objects like numbers. Therefore, the activity of human being 
for language acquisition constitutes the essence of ‗language game‘ that analyzes the 
traditional model of language learning that preludes the word-meaning relation from a 
representational level of objectivity. In Philosophical Investigations, the elemental question is 
how we could obtain the meaning of the word by getting rid of the chauvinism of ontological 
aptitude of language like whether the objects are simple or complex or what‘s sort of 
decomposition we require to uphold the relation between an object and meaning. This type of 
Tractatusian model initiates the jargon of descriptivism, nominalism etc. In Philosophical 
Investigations, Wittgenstein discerns the method of old logic, which conceives the account of 
language guided by the signs centric paradigm of reality and charmed the mental process of 
representation. Wittgenstein urges for the essence articulated by grammar and grammar 
articulates the nature of objectivity. (PI, 371-373). Derek Bolton claims: 
The order of action lies at the basis of logic as grammar; in this way, grammar 
makes a new interpretation of the original word, ‗logos‘. (Bolton:1979, 125) 
Grammar positively for Wittgenstein instigates meanings and words that have meanings, an 
inseparable part of human action. One crucial point is that Wittgenstein even in his later work 
Philosophical Investigations never denies the conception of images, feelings, and the idea of 
inner experiences, etc. Wittgenstein‘s language-game theory shows that the terms like ‗brick‘ 
and ‗bring me a brick‘ etc have some explicit correlations to the mind of the speaker and the 
hearer. Wittgenstein says, ‗We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as 
one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these 
games ―language-games‖ and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-
game.‘ (PI, 7) 
 What Wittgenstein in fact is ready to deny is the solipsistic mentelese outlook that 
inadequately contradicts with linguistic expressions depending on the use theory of language. 
However, if we allow the distinction that Wittgenstein draws between saying and showing, 
then the speaker‘s attempt to say something in words could turn out as futile, as the words are 
yet to articulate any determinate thought. There may be some thoughts that a speaker can 
grasp but cannot express it in words. A speaker who intends to locate these unsayable 





 Besides, the logical structure of language prohibits the panorama of unfolding it in 
language without contravening any logical syntax. In this regard, Marie McGinn has argued 
very convincingly as she notes: 
It is this essential connection between what is shown and what reveals itself 
only in the use or application of language that makes it impossible to say what 
shows itself, and not that the thought that we are trying to express is somehow 
at odds with logical syntax. The idea of the saying/showing distinction is not 
that there are unsayable thoughts that lie beyond the limits of language, but that 
the limit of language-that is, everything that is essential to our using our 
language with sense-is something on which we have an essentially practical 
grasp, something that shows itself only in our actual use of words with sense, 
and something at is therefore itself unsayable. (McGinn: 2001, 28) 
As we know that Tractatus propagates logical-semantics and as it exercises the method of 
showing rather than saying. The conception of unsayability remains because of this logical-
semantic pleas in his book.   
What else? 
Wittgenstein in his later works The Blue and Brown Books and Philosophical Investigations 
stress on the understanding that the meaning of a word or a sentence lies in its uses and so 
there is no concrete or fixed idea of meaning that depends on the context independency. He 
thinks that we cannot say about the certain characteristic of the object that has been referred 
by the meaning of a particular word. There is no fixed meaning that aims to cover all possible 
cases of future use of an expression, which would not be bounded by new contexts. Mainly, 
Wittgenstein‘s purpose is to preserve his family resemblance plea by maintaining the policy of 
the ‗productivity of language‘. Family resemblance theory articulates the applicability of a 
word beyond any static set of characteristic. It actually depends on the varieties of the 
characteristics that may someway resemble to each other, but there is no stagnant sense. The 
conception of rigidity leads towards the private language that Wittgenstein sternly avoids as 
indispensable. Language and especially grammar beget the process of rules following and the 
mode of rules following cannot be systematically private as it grounds in share practices, 
                                                          
1
 The objection of Carnap against Wittgenstein’s doctrine of “corollary of the ‘unsayables’ that are ‘shewn’” 
seems provocative as it hints towards a sort of mysticism. One can avoid it by putting the formal mode of 
speech as proposed by Carnap himself like ‘red is a predicate’ instead of ‘red is a property’.  Anscombe writes: 
‘I once had occasion to remark to Wittgenstein that he was supposed to have a mystical streak. ‘Like a yellow 
streak’, he replied; and that is pretty well how the Vienna Circle felt about certain things in the Tractatus.’ 
(Anscombe: 1971, 82) 
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community and in general non-static public habits of using language. Kripke seems promising 
when he writes: 
Other will then have justification conditions for attributing correct or incorrect 
rule following to the subject. (Kripke: 1982, 89) 
Kripke attributes a type of solution (to an extent one can claim) to Wittgenstein‘s problem that 
mental states, inner experience cannot fix the meaning of terms that may be done by others or 
the people of the community in a shareable sense. The learning procedure is not dependent on 
the inner thoughts, but the process relies on the use of language. In fact, the method of 
learning of language and the process of knowing how to use language must have a goal and 
the goal is nothing but to speak and communicate in the similar way as others did in our 
society. Here one can say like Wittgenstein whether learning is a process of adaptation, which 
absorbed the model of old and new language together. Wittgenstein‘s thought on the family 
resemblance shows that it is always feasible to surpass the habit of uses or the way one 
communicates with others as his rules following hypothesis does not undergo with any static 
and rigid rules. There is no behaviour common to all instances; likewise, there are no 
experiences comparable in all instances of understanding. Creativity is a bigger part of 
language use, but we should also know the limit of language and I suppose it is called the 
‗master of technique‘ as Wittgenstein emphasises in Philosophical Investigations. 
Wittgenstein says, ‗To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand 
a language means to have mastered a technique‘. (PI, 199) Having rebuffed the Tractatus 
model of language of thought Wittgenstein highlights on the training or practice based process 
of language learning. He writes, 
A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the 
teaching of language is not explanation, but training. (PI, 5) 
The point is that a child can learn language through language-game basing on the 
exemplification and training rather than the translation and explanation models. This model 
induces that we can only show what an agent could learn, but we could not say it as this is the 
rigor limitation of language use. The acquisition framework of learning sketches the 
delimitation of language, as the framework cannot be explained through the rules for use of 
language as it escorts to infinite regress. This infinite regress delineates our erudite knowledge 
as a familiar previous knowledge. So the element of creativity in language learning would be 
hampered. The language learning process that undergoes with training also brings out that 
learning to think and speak language is a procedure to learn how to think and speak rather 
than knowing how to imitate or translate through mere description (a kind of knowing that 
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knowledge in Ryle‘s sense). It is not a regimented process to swallow the general rules of 
language, but a practice, which concerns about the natural form of life. Chomsky considers 
human language as undoubtedly biological in part (the existence of different languages entails 
that individual languages could not be wholly innate) and the process of language learning 
and the creativity of language are strongly associated with the universal grammar and the 
innateness hypothesis. However, Wittgenstein does not strongly believe in the biological 
model of language like Chomsky, but unable to ignore the contention that cherished the 
natural history of the language learning procedure. Wittgenstein urges: 
It is sometimes said: animals do not talk because they lack the mental abilities. 
And this means: ―They do not think, and that is why they do not talk.‖ But – 
they simply do not talk. Or better: they do not use language – if we disregard 
the most primitive forms of language. – Giving orders, asking questions, telling 
stories, having a chat, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, 
eating, drinking, playing.  (PI, 25)      
Language is nothing but a shared form of human life and the language-game can be 
considered as a conservatory of our primitive behavior as it has some common ground that 
can help us to share and comprehend each other‘s interest. Wittgenstein thinks that the 
creative part of language game offers us an ample freedom of language to create something 
new, but we must be aware that this ample process is finite.  
 My appraisal is that language is an art of the world that is not created by any 
individual being. We simply participate in this art of language and sometime contribute 
something new in the structure of language through the interaction between the subjects and 
inter-subjects (I, Others plus World). The language actually goes beyond human creation, but 
still subsists in the social construction. We only can practice it and express it on our thinking 
through a propositional form. The very old natural history of language vindicates that the 
elementary application of language uses like processing, constructing, evaluating, or 
especially thinking, etc., most of the chief parts of language uses apart from its ‗reference 
fixation‘ rely on the ‗internal dialogue‘ of language. The basic concepts are innate in nature, 
while the complex concept, such as GRAY BOOK, are composed out of simpler building 
blocks. It is simply physically impossible to have them innately hard-wired in the brain. 
Wittgenstein also aims to evade Plato‘s Meno dilemma of having to know what one learns, 
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